Winners and Losers: Europe and Debt after the Great War and after the Great Recession by Bertola, Giuseppe
14 December 2021
AperTO - Archivio Istituzionale Open Access dell'Università di Torino
Original Citation:





(Article begins on next page)
Anyone can freely access the full text of works made available as "Open Access". Works made available under a
Creative Commons license can be used according to the terms and conditions of said license. Use of all other works
requires consent of the right holder (author or publisher) if not exempted from copyright protection by the applicable law.
Availability:
This is the author's manuscript
This version is available http://hdl.handle.net/2318/1770839 since 2021-02-02T11:42:34Z
 
 
Winners and Losers: 
Europe and Debt after the Great War  
and after the Great Recession 
 




Reviewing views once expressed by J. M. Keynes, and 
adopting some of their great brevity, persuasive prose, and 
occasionally cryptic logic, this essay compares the economic 
and political sources and consequences of the Great War 
boom and bust in Europe to those of the similar if so far less 
dramatic income swings and debt experiences of Euro area 
countries. 
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1. Keynes and the Great War debt 
In his Introduction to the Reconstruction of Europe essays, published in a series of 
Supplements by the Manchester Guardian, Keynes (1922) downplays the role of 
“purely economic considerations” as a guide to international policy during the then-
current economic crisis. He argues that it is wrong to focus on the temporary 
malaise of downward economic fluctuation, and confuse them with the “more 
permanent symptoms of the bad politics of Europe.”  
The politico-economic problems of the time and Keynes’s position in the debate are 
outlined and discussed in detail by Tooze (2014). Doubting the sustainability of 
German war reparation payments to the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, and 
recognizing that they were ultimately flowing to the United States to cover the 
winning Powers’ financial obligations, Keynes thought and argued as an advisor to 
the British Treasury that renegotiation of both reparations and debt was necessary to 
forestall the possibility that Britain would be reduced to a state of complete financial 
helplessness and dependence.  The American President Wilson not surprisingly took 
a different position and saw the situation as an opportunity to establish the United 
States as the pre-eminent Power in the new world order. The resulting political and 
economic problems pushed Europe and the world into a prolonged state of crisis, 
sowing the seeds of the Second World War.   
This essay reviews that situation and discusses whether similar issues are relevant to 
the current European crisis and its possible resolution.  
2. Recession, deflation, and public debt 
It is a preliminary necessity to introduce basic economic insights that will prove 
useful in what follows. One is explained well by Keynes (1931). In industrial market 
economies goods are immediately sold for money, and “an interval of time elapses 
between production and sale.” Production can therefore be brought to a standstill by 
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an expectation that the money price at the date of sale will be lower than the money 
costs paid during production, which are mostly predetermined by long-term wage 
contracts. That expectation can be self-fulfilling if lower production, and lower 
income, exert downward pressure on product-market prices.  
Self-fulfilling expectations of low inflation also result from expenditure and price-
setting choices, as consumers and investors find it advisable to delay expenditure if 
prices are expected to decline, and the predetermined ‘sticky’ prices of some output 
components are depressed by price-setters’ attempt to keep the prices that they set 
now (but plan to keep fixed for a time) aligned with what they expect their 
competitors’ and suppliers’ prices to be in the future.  
Keynes also explained and we now know that when money is not linked to species 
but can be supplied by central banks on a conventional basis then monetary policy 
can influence the nominal interest rate, aiming to keep the financial cost of 
production aligned with price-change expectations. The economy can however find 
itself in a deflationary liquidity trap, where monetary policy is powerless because 
expected inflation is so low that only unfeasibly negative nominal interest rates 
could restore incentives to produce.  
Public expenditure may in general and in such a situation increase aggregate 
demand, incomes, and inflation. Additional preliminary points also need to be made 
regarding the dynamics of the public debt resulting from such expansionary fiscal 
policy. As emphasized by Sargent (2012) the value of any bond is the present 
expected value of their repayment, and for public bonds this is the excess of tax 
revenue on government expenditure. Some of the debt may be denominated in 
domestic currency, so that the real value of repayment depends on the country’s 
own inflation or deflation. And some is owed to the country’s own citizens, who (or 
their descendants) are the source of tax revenue and the destination of government 
expenditure. Some debt however may be denominated in foreign currency and owed 
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to the citizens or governments of other countries, raising more difficult economic 
and political issues. 
3. Debt and post-war reconstructions of Europe 
The Entente powers accumulated external and not just domestic debt when in 2017, 
as part of a deliberate high-risk strategy meant to achieve such material superiority 
as to make it possible to deliver a knock-out blow to Germany, they chose to draw 
on America resources and pull the United States into war. Tooze (2014) argues that 
the Wilson administration saw in this situation an opportunity to achieve political 
supremacy in the new world order. For the United States the issuance and later 
existence of a large debt stock made it possible to exert political power. Because that 
source of power would disappear not only if debt were forgiven but also if it could be 
repaid easily, the Wilson administration exerted its policy-making influence in ways 
that kept debtor countries’ economies in a depressed state and made it difficult for 
their governments to raise funds other than by exacting war reparation payments 
from Germany. 
In the 1920s depression and debt were economic manifestations of political 
struggles. This motivated Keynes to emphasize that recognizing and addressing the 
latter would be key to reconstructing Europe. In practice neither political nor 
economic issues could be resolved, and the Great Depression of 1929 pushed Europe 
into a crisis that precipitated into World War Two.  
After World War Two a potentially similar situation was managed very differently. 
Rather than requesting debt repayment the United States deployed the Marshall 
Plan to finance reconstruction and ensure that supply and demand would meet at a 
high level. Europe addressed its political problems using economic tools, starting 
with a common market in coal and steel, progressing towards the 1992 Single Market 
without barriers to the movement of goods, people, and capital, and culminating 
5 
 
with the adoption of a single currency by most European Union member countries 
in the late 1990s.  
The process of market unification was meant to pursue not only economic but also 
cultural, social, and political goals, using economic policy to achieve through ever 
closer integration not only growth but also stability and cohesion in Europe. This 
scheme, originally devised to forestall future wars, was subsequently tasked to 
ensure commitment to democracy in countries that like Spain, Portugal, and Greece 
had recently experienced dictatorship, and to ease the post-Communist transition of 
Central and Easter European countries. 
4.  Debt in Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union 
For about ten years now neither growth nor stability or cohesion have characterized 
a Europe that again finds itself burdened by international financial imbalances, and 
in need of reconstructing not its material resources (which were not much damaged 
even by World War One and are as plentiful now as ever) but its institutional 
infrastructure.  
Public debt looms large in a monetary union without fiscal capacity (Sargent, 2012), 
but its sources and consequences are not always the same. This time income swings 
and ex post problematic debt stocks did not originate from war victories and defeats. 
Rather, asymmetric booms and boosts were triggered by the financial market 
integration afforded by adoption of a single currency and by the financial shocks 
delivered by the Great Recession of 2008, when much of originally private debt and 
credit was made public by government bank rescues.  
Finance eases and accompanies growth but is also a source of economic and political 
instability, because credit is extended on expectations that can prove unrealistic ex 
post. All sides hope to win but only one side can win a war, so not all war debt can 
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always be repaid. Debt is also risky in times of great structural transformation, when 
expectations are as crucial and can be as misguided as in wartime.  
In the late 1990s and early 2000s adoption of a common currency in Europe, 
enlargement of the European Union and China’s access to world trade, and 
deregulation of the private financial industry triggered domestic credit creation and 
international financial flows comparable to those seen during the Great War. A 
portion of international financial imbalances funded ‘downhill’ investment as capital 
moved from core countries to peripheral countries where it was scarcer and could 
promise better returns. Another portion funded public and private consumption in 
the latter relatively backward countries, where economic and cultural convergence 
promised better productivity and living standards.  
Expectations of productivity convergence were supported in the eyes of both lenders 
and borrowers by a vision of European integration as a mean to the end of 
homogeneous and better institutions, cultures, and policies. There are good reasons 
for capital not to move to poor countries when their poverty is due to inferior 
technology or institutions rather than to capital scarcity. If adoption of a single 
currency is a key step towards full integration, which would in turn allow relatively 
backward countries to develop faster, then capital moves across borders not only to 
exploit the better investment returns offered by relatively capital-poor countries, but 
also to finance consumption. Consumption levels should not converge slowly within 
fully integrated financial markets, and residents of countries where productivity is 
expected to grow faster should anticipate future income growth in their 
consumption.  
Plausible as it was to expect monetary unification to accelerate productivity 
convergence across the euro area, no relevant precedent existed for that experiment. 
Theoretically legitimate expectations of productivity convergence were not 
confirmed by realizations: within the euro area, there was before the crisis a 
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tendency for countries that accumulated negative international imbalances to 
experience deterioration of institutional quality as well as of total factor productivity 
(Bertola, 2013). Adoption of the euro certainly eased international financial 
integration and generated plausible expectations of faster convergence. However, 
perhaps because capital inflows relaxed external competitiveness constraints, it did 
not deliver a realization of that expectation. 
5.  A fragile Economic and Monetary Union and the Great Recession 
With hindsight, adoption of a single currency (but not of a common policy 
framework in many other policy areas) should not have been expected to imply 
convergence of productivity-relevant institutions. Convergence is a central feature of 
the process envisioned by European integration, but it is empirically elusive even 
within countries, where regions converge only slowly even in a context of much 
stronger institutional cohesion than in the European Union. 
Adoption the euro however did make it easier for financial markets to integrate and 
accumulate large international imbalances, not all of which were the counterpart of 
productive capital accumulation. When the Great Recession struck, financial 
imbalances were inadequately supported by policy-shaping and risk-sharing 
institutional mechanisms. Within each country economically strong areas and 
individuals coexist with weaker ones, shocks have asymmetric effects, and a stable 
set of private and public financial instruments smooth out their implications. Across 
the borders of euro area countries, conversely, private financial markets proved 
unable to operate during the crisis, and public financial instruments were deployed 
only as emergency measures.   
Imbalances can remain sustainable across integrating economies if convergence 
expectations remain stable. But if faith in convergence is loss, then default and 
disintegration become possible. In the absence of other loss-sharing mechanisms, 
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redefining the real value of legal obligations is more attractive when it becomes 
more burdensome to honor them, because asymmetric shocks are associated with a 
decline of the expected rate of convergence and/or coincide with increases of market 
rates of interest. Debt default, devaluation, and inflation can be deterred by the 
disruption they imply for pre-existing contractual arrangements and trust, but 
become attractive when unexpected shocks make disruption and loss of credibility 
appear less damaging.  
The resulting environment, like that of the 1920s, is unfortunately well characterized 
by what Keynes described as an “atmosphere of distrust and hostility.”  
6.  Debt and power then and now 
History did not repeat itself, of course. It would be far-fetched to argue that the 
German government pursued a dominance scheme like the one that Tooze (2014) 
attributes to the Wilson administration. The rise of debt during the early phase of 
economic and monetary union was a market phenomenon, driven in the eyes of 
both lenders and borrowers by expectations that institutional and economic 
structures would converge across Europe’s core and periphery, and perhaps counted 
on taxpayer third parties to fill the gap between promised and actual repayment.   
In the recent and still current European crisis, however, some of the tensions that 
large debt stocks generated in the 1920s are present. The actors are not the same. 
Now China is the lender, not the United States, which financed the allies in World 
War One but runs large deficits before and after the great recession. Within Europe 
the ultimate debtors are Spain, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, not Germany. But the 
issues are very much the same and (as far as sparse historical statistics make it 
possible to see) the magnitude of repayment promises and problems is similar. 
Keynes’s views on the sustainability of German reparations echo current debates on 
Greek debt sustainability, and Tooze’s (2014) depiction of the Wilson administration 
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financial dominance process has some applicability to the current configuration of 
European Union policymaking, where co-decision supranational processes 
hampered by unanimity requirements are superseded by intergovernmental 
negotiations dominated by the economic and financial strength of creditor 
countries. 
7. Politics and economics then and now 
Keynes's views, while debatable and possibly as misguided as some of the similar and 
opposite ones expressed then and now, are as topical in the current context as they 
were when he expressed them. In the words of Keynes (1922), “[p]assions of many 
kinds overwhelm the economic motive in individuals and in nations. Economic self-
interest did not prevent the war [.]” Economic self-interest is also not what triggered 
adoption of the euro, a project that was much more strongly motivated by political 
compromises about German reunification than by the promise of more efficient 
market interactions.  
The war and the euro did result in the accumulation of debt that afterwards made 
and makes Europe’s reconstruction or further development politically difficult.  Like 
then, so now income distribution pervades economic policy debates.  
Tooze (2014) discusses in the detail how macroeconomic policies shifted resources 
both across debtor and creditor countries, and across groups of individuals within 
countries. In Entente countries, fiscal austerity and deflation in the 1020s favored 
capitalists, while workers had to give back some of the welfare they had extracted in 
wartime conditions of labor scarcity and precious social peace. In Germany and 
other defeated countries hyperinflation ripped the social fabric and triggered a fight 
for resources that greatly increased income and wealth inequality.  
Similar issues currently play a subdued but obvious role in the conduct of the single 
monetary policy and in the implementation of fiscal policy constraints. Those who 
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represent the interests of creditor countries naturally favor high interest rates and 
low inflation even as this makes it more difficult for other countries to service their 
debt. Those who represent the latter argue for fiscal expansion. Professing faith in 
market interest rate spreads as regulators of public debt, or advocating pro-cyclical 
fiscal policy as a remedy to debt problems, may be just a sign of economic ignorance. 
But such views are likely to derive as much from self-interest as from self-delusion 
when they are expressed in support of policy prescriptions that benefit creditors and 
debtors respectively. In the words of Sargent (2017), “[…] government bond holders 
want a fiscal policy providing them high real returns” and, symmetrically, the 
governments of debtor countries will prefer policies that reduce repayment burdens.  
Categorical positions do not support a constructive debate where all sides aim to 
persuade and are willing to compromise. The pros and cons of policies differ both 
across countries and across individuals, and should be debated clearly. As in the 
1920s so now Keynes would find it appropriate to organize a forum for the exposition 
and debate of admittedly National but diverse perspectives on common European 
issues, as he did when he invited both Anatole France (who failed to deliver an 
essay) and Gabriel Hanotaux (a French academician “of decidedly reactionary 
tendencies”) to write in the Guardian Supplements on how far international policy 
should be governed by purely economic considerations. 
8. Macroeconomic theory and policy then and now 
The same tight monetary policy and fiscal austerity that keep inflation low in 
creditor countries can drive debtor economies into the deflationary spiral that, as 
outlined at the beginning of this essay, results from the interaction of production 
lags and price rigidities. These are certainly more relevant now than in the 1920s, 
and they also imply that exchange rate flexibility would not be a solution to any of 
Europe’s economic and political problems.  
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Even though the single currency is the reason of both debt accumulation and 
divergent monetary policy preferences, if the member countries of the euro area (or 
perhaps smaller regions within each) used different currencies not only would their 
monetary policy be easily swayed by poor credibility, but their consumers and 
producers would be faced by too much uncertainty to pursue long-term 
investments. A broad and stable macroeconomic environment for dozens of plants, 
thousands of workers, and hundreds of millions of potential customers over one or 
two decades is necessary for companies to even consider designing a modern car, a 
project requiring several years and billions of investment and organization of 
production in a vast network of component facilities.  
When the costs and prices of these and other production activities can be expressed 
in terms of a common currency within a stable economic area of suitable size, then a 
modern economy can provide its citizens with technologically advanced goods and 
well paid employment opportunities. The size of European Nations was suitable at 
the time of their industrial revolution, but is too small in the 21st century. Then, and 
now, the price rigidity that eases search and long-term contractual relationships 
needs accompanying measures: not only monetary policy, but also private and public 
financial instruments capable of smoothing shocks hitting specific regions, 
household, or firms within the aggregate economy.  
Recent work at the frontier of macroeconomic theory points out that within a 
currency union insurance against such shocks is more valuable for society than for 
uncoordinated financial market participants (Farhi and Werning, 2017).  The 
argument is based on aggregate demand externalities in the presence of nominal 
price or wage rigidities and country-specific consumption pattern. Its logic is the 
same as that underlying the Keynes (1929) “transfer problem” and indicates that 
cross-border fiscal stabilization would be just as beneficial for the euro area as 
within-country redistribution obviously was for traditional Nation-States. 
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9. Final remarks 
The central powers lost the great war, an peripheral countries lost bets placed before 
the great recession. Both in the 1920s and now it is much easier to outline the 
problems this generates than to find a practical solution.  
The non-economic motivations of the European international integration process 
and the role of economic forces in its implementation are key both in generating 
problems and when devising solutions. Europeans should recognize that integration 
is politically and economically necessary, and work on resolving their cultural 
differences and conflicting interests through suitable political compromises and 
appropriately coordinated policies. Because governments are political agents that 
wield economic instruments, it is certainly far from surprising to see them debate in 
favor of their citizens’ special interest. In bringing economics to bear on politics and 
policy, however, it is crucial not to dressing self-interested arguments as theoretical 
truths. It is incorrect and counterproductive to argue that economic integration or 
low interest rates and inflation benefit everybody, or that a specific set of structural 
reforms is right for everybody.  
A more constructive approach should admit that each integration step and policy 
action triggers heterogeneous gains and losses, and seek broad and constructive 
compromises between conflicting interests. Economic research can help if it 
analyzes how and why reality deviates from the perfect and complete markets that in 
theory would justify a representative agent approach to policy problems, recognizes 
that markets and policies not only maximize production but also resolve conflicting 
interests in its distribution, and characterizes policy tradeoffs in such a way as to 
build consensus around sound macro policies and structural reforms. Only 
addressing the distributional implications of economic integration and of policies 
may help protect EMU from the political and economic risk of a permanent reversal 
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